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Abstract
This paper analyzes the strategic halal policy where the duopoly firms invest into
the halal certification under their governments’ subsidization policies. We analyze
the firms’ halal level-price choices and the governments’ optimal halal certification
investment policies. The analysis is based on third-country model that is modeled
in three-stage game. In the first stage the governments determine an optimal policy
and in the following stages the firms first compete in halal certification level and then
export to an imperfectly competitive third-market. The study shows, among others,
that the governments’ optimal halal certification policy, subsidy or tax, depends on the
degree of firms’ halal-price competition.
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1 Introduction
The halal trade volume has reached a significant level recently1. Consumers choose a halal
good based on the halal logo that may reflect their conviction on the standards or level of
halal. Generally, each government has its own halal standard and logo 2. Halal Malaysia
(2014) has approved a number of international bodies for halal certification. The motives of
a government policy targeted at product halal standards, may simply be a response to the
need for consumer protection due to asymmetric information about product halal level. For
instance, Abdul Raufu and Ahmad Naqiyuddin (2014) report that in Malaysia, consumers
strongly are attracted by the halal logo. However, such policies may also be a means to
protect the domestic industries from import competition or to capture international market
shares. Halal certification can be classified as a social concern part in a wide variety of
standard issues. There have been increasing studies on the effect of standards policy on
trade since it became important in the global trading system. Swinnen and Vandemoortele
(2012) review the literature in standards and conclude that product standards can act as a
barrier to trade.
The purpose of this study is to propose a model that explains the implication of a
strategic-trade policy or rent-shifting motive for policy applied to investment in halal certifi-
cation improvement. In particular, we adopt a third-country model of Brander and Spencer
(1985) while displaying the main features of product-quality variety of Ishii (2013b). Ishii
(2013b) argues that the firm can set a higher price if the product quality is superior. Whereas,
Zhou et al. (2002) shows that for the less developed country (the developed country), a uni-
lateral policy involves a subsidy (tax) to investment in quality under Bertrand competition
and a tax (subsidy) under Cournot competition. These previous studies show that product
1Abdul-Talib and Abd-Razak (2013) report that in 2010 the level reached USD 2.3 trillion, and is in-
creasing as the world total population is estimated to be about 2 billion people.
2For instance, Zairy and Norazlina (2007) report such example of government intervention in halal market
that is the implementation of the Halal Hub policy in Malaysian’s National Economic Plan.
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characteristics affect the government policies. Thus it is worthwhile to establish a model of
an imperfectly competitive halal market.
A firm must invest in halal certification compliance process such as food testing in order
to get and maintain the certification. Furthermore, the process may vary among govern-
ments and that may reflect investment cost. We generalize this process by introducing a
halal level function that represents the correlation between the cost of investment and the
halal level. Consumers consider the halal level in their utility function. Thus it has an impact
on consumers’ utility maximization and eventually will be reflected in the demand function.
As a result, the consumers’ perception on a particular halal logo will change the govern-
ment’s policies and the behavior of the firm. We employ a three-stage game to illustrate
the interaction of these entities. In the first stage, the government maximizes its welfare
by determining its policy. In the second stage, the firms determine the halal certification
investment. In the last stage, the firms compete in prices. Among others, the results show
that the government’s policy depend on the degree of the halal-price competition. Further-
more, as have been discussed in previous literature, the subsidy may give an advantage to
the firms in the imperfectly competitive market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 constructs the basic assumptions
and model. Section 3 examines the price-setting stage. Section 4 analyzes the halal invest-
ment that affect the halal level. Section 5 discusses the government’s optimal policy. Section
6 presents the conclusion.
2 Assumptions and Model
Let us suppose an international duopoly that is composed of two firms in home and foreign
countries that produce halal products whose halal levels are determined endogenously by
themselves. Both firms export all their products to a third country. The home firm has
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supplied a high level halal good (more reliable) and has earned a good reputation in the
third country. In contrast, the foreign firm has supplied a low level halal good (less reliable)
and has earned a poor reputation. Let’s assume that the foreign firm survives in the industry
with its poor reputation halal good because it earns a non-negative profit.
When the firms in the industry supply halal goods which use different halal logos, cus-
tomers in the third country must explicitly appreciate this quality difference between the
logos in their utility functions. In other words, consumers recognize these halal level differ-
ences in their utility functions. Hence, we assume that the utility function of a representative
consumer in the third country is given by
u(x, x∗, h, h∗) = e(x+ x∗) + k(hx+ h∗x∗)− m(x
2 + x∗2)
2 − nxx
∗ + z, (m > n)
where x(x∗) and h(h∗) are the demand, and the halal level of the goods respectively.; z
is the demand for the aggregated good (e.g. numéraire) and e, k,m and n are all positive
constants ( a superscript,*, denotes the variables of the foreign country)3. Hence, the demand
functions for the goods, x and x∗, are respectively represented by:
x = A− ap+ bp∗ + αh− βh∗ (1)
x∗ = A− ap∗ + bp+ αh∗ − βh (2)






, α = km
m2 − n2
, and β = kn
m2 − n2
. Under the condition of n < m, we have
3This type of utility function is used in Ishii (2013b). The utility function that explicitly appreciate
product qualities is U(q1, q2) = α(q1 + q2) − (β/2)(q12 + q22) − γq1q2 + z, where α, β, and γ are positive
constants and β > γ shows that the preferences are biased toward a consumption of varieties. (Singh and
Vives, 1984; Ottaviano et al., 2002). This type of utility function explicitly considers product qualities and
quality information bias in addition to product quantities (Ishii, 2013a).
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0 < b < a, 0 < β < α, 0 < αβ = ab, 0 < A. (3)
Equation(1) shows the consumers’ preferences for a “love of variety”. Meanwhile, equa-
tion(1) and equation(3) show that although a rise in the halal level(price) of each firm’s
good increases (decreases) the demand for its own good and reduces the demand for its
rival’s good, it raises (reduces) the total demand for the two goods, and vice versa. Equa-
tion (3) also indicates that the home and foreign goods are substitutive foe each other from
the cross-halal level effect, which implies that the substitutes degree between the two goods
depends on k and as well as on n in the model. It also implies that the slopes of the firms’ re-
action curves in a Bertrand industry are both positive in the price-setting stage, but negative
in the quality-setting stage, contrary to the assumption made by previous studies.
Firms’ halal certification compliance, which rely on their halal certification investments,
are given by the level functions that are both strictly increasing and concave with respect to
their halal certification investments and are shown respectively as:
h = h(I), h′(I) > 0, h′′(I) < 0
h∗ = h∗(I∗), h∗′(I∗) > 0, h∗′′(I∗) < 0
(4)
We assume that as the firms’ halal certification investments rise, the h(I) and h∗(I∗)
approach the finite limits hL and h∗L, respectively. In order to indicate the difference in
the halal levels between the two firms, suppose that, given the firms’ current halal levels,










Furthermore, let us assume throughout this study that all markets for production fac-
tors including halal certification investments are perfectly competitive, hence, the firms can
make their halal certification investment at a constant price, PI(P ∗I∗). The prices may differ
according to the governments’ interventions.
Based on the assumptions and functions mentioned above, firm profits in the developing
and developed countries are, respectively, defined as
π = (p− c){A− ap+ bp∗ + αh(I)− βh∗(I∗)} − PII + sI (6a)
π∗ = (p∗ − c∗){A− ap∗ + bp+ αh∗(I∗)− βh(I)} − P ∗I∗I∗ + s∗I∗ (6b)
where s(s∗) is the certification subsidy (tax if it is negative) that the developing country’s
government gives to its firm’s halal certification investment. Firms act to maximise their
profits, as defined in Equation (6a) and (6b). In the political decision stage the governments
determine s and s∗ to maximize their economic welfare. The countries’ welfare are given
respectively as:
W = π − sI (7a)
W ∗ = π∗ − s∗I∗ (7b)
The firms and governments play a three-stage game. In the first stage, the governments
4Differences in cost and quality levels between countries can be assumed with a difference in country
classification, such as developing and developed countries (Ishii, 2013b; Zhou et al., 2002)
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set their optimal halal certification investment subsidies to maximize their levels of economic
welfare. In the second stage, the two firms determine their halal certification investments
to maximize their profits. In the third stage, they decide on their prices so as to maximize
their profits, non-cooperatively. We assume that the governments and firms act as followers
in their decision-making stages. We adopt a backward-induction method to solve this three-
stage game problem.
3 Price competition in the third stage
In the third stage, the firms decide on their prices so as to maximize their profits, defined
by equation(6a) and equation(6b), which under the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in the third
stage is characterized by
A− 2ap+ bp∗ + αh(I)− βh∗(I∗) + ac = 0 (8a)
A− 2ap∗ + bp+ αh∗(I∗)− βh(I) + ac∗ = 0 (8b)
where Equations (8a) and (8b) are the first-order conditions and reaction functions of the
home firm and the foreign firm, respectively. Second order conditions for both firms are
satisfied and the reaction curves for both firms are upward-sloping are given:
πpp = π∗p∗p∗ = −2a < 0 (9a)
πpp∗ = π∗p∗p = b > 0 (9b)
This means that prices are strategically complementary to each other. The Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium in the third stage is stable as shown by equation(3), equation(9a), equation(9b),
πpp + π∗p∗p∗ = −4a < 0 and πppπ∗p∗p∗ − πpp∗π∗p∗p∗ = 4a2 − b2 > 0.
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The industry equilibrium price for the home and foreign firms in the price-setting third
stage are given, respectively, as
p = h
∗(I)(αb− 2aβ) + h(I)(2aα− βb) + 2a(A+ ac) + b(A+ ac∗)
4a2 − b2 (10)
p∗ = h
∗(I∗)(2aα− βb) + h(I)(αb− 2aβ) + 2a(A+ ac∗) + b(A+ ac)
4a2 − b2 (11)
These equations, (10) and (11), show that prices depend on all the coefficients included
in their demand functions and their product halal certification investments determined in
the second stage, which in turn demonstrates that these prices eventually depend on the
halal investment subsidies set by the respective governments in the first stage.
Futhermore, the effect of the firms’ halal certification investment on the prices can be




















4a2 − b2 < 0 (12)
Therefore, equation(12) can be paraphrased as the following propositions:
Proposition 1. An increase in the firm’s halal certification investment of firm raises its
own price, and reduces its rival’s price, and vice versa.
This proposition explains intuitively that a greater investment into the halal certification
by a firm incurs an additional cost, but it gains a good reputation, hence increasing its
product demand. These situations therefore combine to encourage the firm to raise its price.
In contrast, a rise in the halal certification investment of a firm reduces demand for the
product of the rival firm and hence results in a decline in its rival’s price. Furthermore,
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the above proposition also shows that any firm can raise its price whenever it improves its
product halal level through greater halal certification investment.
Equation(12) also shows another feature of how a change in a firm’s halal level affects










2a− b < 0 (13)
which produce the following proposition:
Proposition 2. A rise in the product halal investment of the home (foreign) country’s firm
makes the price competition between firms less (more) intense, and vice versa.
Based on this proposition, the firm in the home country may intentionally produce a
good whose quality is superior to that of the foreign country’s firm in order to wage an
intensive price battle. In this case, choosing to produce a high-level high-price halal product
is regarded as one of the business strategies available to the halal producer in a competitive
international market.
4 Halal level competition in the Second Stage
In this section, we analyze the firms’ product halal level choices and investigate how changes
in the product halal investment subsidies provided by the home and foreign countries’ gov-
ernments affect their firms’ halal product level and price competition. As both firms’ halal
level are endogenously determined through their halal certification investment decisions as
shown by equations (4) and (5), their goods are both treated as variable-level commodities
from an analytical point of view.
The firms act as followers in halal level competition and decide on their halal certification
investment I and I∗ so as to maximize their profits given their governments’ halal investment
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subsidies, their rivals’ halal certification investment and their first-order conditions in the
third stage. Thus, the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium conditions in the second stage for the
firms’ halal certification investment decisions are given by
(p− c){h′(I)(α− b β2a)} − PI + s = 0 (14a)
(p∗ − c∗){h∗′(I∗)(α− b β2a)} − P
∗
I∗ + s∗ = 0 (14b)
where Equations (14a) and (14b) are the first-order conditions and reaction functions for the
home and foreign firms, respectively. We assume that the second-order conditions are both




2a + (p − c)q





2a + (p −
c)q∗′′(I∗)} < 0. These conditions may affect the level of certification as had been shown in
a study of quality advancement by Spencer and Brander (1983) .
Regarding equation (14a) in which the left-hand side is the marginal profit πI of the
home country’s firm with respect to its halal certification investment I, a rise (fall) in I∗
reduces(increases) πI because it lowers (raises) the product price p of the home country’s
firm, as shown clearly in equation (12). Therefore, I must decrease(rises) to retain its first-
order condition given by equation (14a)5. Similarly, it is shown that I and I∗ also have a
negative relationships in equation (14b). Intuitively, the firms’ halal certification investment
are strategically substitutive for each other.
Furthermore, equation (14a) and equation (14b) show that halal investment depends on
production costs, c and c∗, and subsidies, s and s∗. Total differentiation of equation (14a)
5As in Ishii (2013b).
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where, D = πIIπ∗I∗I∗ − π∗I∗IπII∗ > 0. We assume that the effect of halal investment on
marginal profit dominates the cross-effect:
π∗I∗I∗ < π
∗
I∗I < 0, πII < πII∗ < 0 (16)
Hence we may write the following proposition:
Proposition 3. An increase in a government subsidy leads to a rise in the investment of
its firm, but leads to a reduction in the investment of its rival’s firm, and vice versa.
From (14a)and (14b), we know that the halal investment are strategically substitutive
for each other and their reaction function curves have negative slope. Therefore, a rise in a
government subsidy shifts its firm’s reaction function outward, which raises the investment
of its firm and reduces the investment of its rival’s firm, and vice versa.






















Hence we write the following proposition:
Proposition 4. A rise in the subsidy of a country raises its firm’s halal level but reduces its
rival’s halal level and vice versa.
Combining (17) and (15) we see that the subsidy may provide an advantage to the firm
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in the international market. Furthermore, we may check the intensity of the halal level
competition by comparing those results.
The effect of a subsidy may be checked by differentiating p and p∗ with respect to s and


















4a2 − b2 +
(2aα− βb)hIIs
4a2b2 < 0 (18)
Intuitively, these equations show that the subsidy increases the price of its firm and
decreases the price of the rival in the price competition. As the subsidy pushes the investment
of the firm, thus we know that it increases the halal level and lastly pushes the price up. We
may conclude in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. A rise in the subsidy level increases the price
We may also conclude that the subsidy may increase the intensity of competition. How-
ever, subsidy by the home country and the foreign country have different effect on the
domestic firm’s price.
5 Optimal Halal Certification Policies in the First Stage
In the first stage, the government of home and foreign countries, respectively, determine the
halal certification subsidy to maximize their economic welfare as defined by equation (7).
Given the optimal points in the second and third stages, the first-order conditions for the
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economic welfare maximization of the countries are given by
∂W
∂s
= A(Mhs +Nh∗s) + sIs (19a)
∂W ∗
∂s∗
= B(Mh∗s∗ +Nhs∗) + s∗I∗s∗ (19b)
where, A = b(p − c),M = (αb− 2aβ)4a2 − b2 , and N =
(2aα− βb)
4a2 − b2 . These equations are the
reaction functions of the countries in the first stage. We then derive the home and foreign
optimal subsidy from (19a):










The sign of the optimal subsidy depends on an equation which is extremely complicated.
However, it yields an interesting argument where the subsidy or tax depends on the sign of
the equation which subsequently depends on the marginal level effects.
Proposition 6. The sign of s depends on the marginal level effects
6 Concluding remarks
We have established a third-country trade model of an international duopoly that consists
of firms producing halal products. The model introduces halal level functions that represent
the correlation between the cost of investment and the halal level. Meanwhile, the demand
function is constructed by incorporating the concept of “love of variety” which represents
how consumers choose products based on the halal level.
The result shows that the halal certification investment increases (decreases) the home
firm (foreign) price. This reflects the argument of Ishii (2013b) which states that a firm
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may charge a higher price than its rival if the consumers appreciate the characteristic of the
product. Furthermore, the study also shows that a subsidy by the government may give an
advantage (disadvantage) to the home (foreign) firm. The subsidy also positively affects the
halal level.
The model can be extended to analyze the cases of cooperative game. For instance, we
may make an assumption that the firms form a strategic alliance in the second stage by
jointly conducting their halal investment. Meanwhile, the governments may also implement
strategic cooperation by jointly determining their policies.
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